Anomaly-based intrusion detection using fuzzy rough clustering by Chimphlee, Witcha et al.
Anomaly-Based Intrusion Detection using Fuzzy Rough Clustering 
 
 
Witcha Chimphlee1, Abdul Hanan Abdullah2, Mohd Noor Md Sap2,  
Surat Srinoy1, and Siriporn Chimphlee1 
 
1Faculty of Science and Technology, Suan Dusit Rajabhat University 
E-mail : {witcha_chi,surat_sri,siriporn_chi}@dusit.ac.th 
2Faculty of Computer Science and Information Systems, Universiti Teknologi Malaysia 
E-mail : {hanan, mohdnoor}@fsksm.utm.my 
 
 
Abstract 
 
It is an important issue for the security of network 
to detect new intrusion attack and also to increase the 
detection rates and reduce false positive rates in 
Intrusion Detection System (IDS). Anomaly intrusion 
detection focuses on modeling normal behaviors and 
identifying significant deviations, which could be novel 
attacks. The normal and the suspicious behavior in 
computer networks are hard to predict as the 
boundaries between them cannot be well defined. We 
apply the idea of the Fuzzy Rough C-means (FRCM) to 
clustering analysis. FRCM integrates the advantage of 
fuzzy set theory and rough set theory that the improved 
algorithm to network intrusion detection. The 
experimental results on dataset KDDCup99 show that 
our method outperforms the existing unsupervised 
intrusion detection methods 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The information protections are often used to protect 
computer system as the first step of defence. Intrusion 
detection is the second step for secure defence behind 
firewall, which can monitor network in the 
precondition of not affecting network performance. 
Intrusion detection is the whole process that audits, 
tracks, identifies and detects the unauthorized accesses 
or abnormal phenomena, actions and events in the 
system [1]. 
The ideal Network Intrusion Detection System will 
efficiently and effectively classify network traffic 
between benign and belligerent. A great deal of 
research and work in Network Intrusion Detection 
involves the development of attack signatures. 
An intrusion detection system (IDSs) is an effective 
tool for determining whether unauthorized users are 
attempting to access, have already accessed, or have 
compromised the network. It is important to find out 
intrusion quickly and effectively. IDSs may be some 
software or hardware systems that monitor the 
different events occurring in the actual network and 
analyze them for signs of security threats.  
Most of machine learning approaches are based on 
supervised learning, and have following problems [2]: 
1) a large volume of training data should be collected 
and classified manually; 2) the performance of the IDS 
depends on the quality of the training data; 3) a 
training phase with the huge data is computationally 
expensive and can not be performed in an incremental 
manner; 4) it is difficult to detect new intrusions which 
are not trained. Recently, the clustering algorithms 
based on unsupervised learning have been proposed 
for IDS to overcome these problems [2-5]. 
Unsupervised learning is very beneficial for intrusion 
detection domain, since the labeled data is expensive 
while unlabeled data can be obtained very easily from 
log files and audit files [6]. 
A host-base IDS adds a targeted layer to security to 
particularly vulnerable or essential systems, it is 
installed on an individual system and monitors audit 
trails and system logs for suspicious behaviors; a 
network-based IDS monitors the LAN network traffic, 
packet by packet, in real time to determine whether 
traffic conforms to predetermined attack signatures [7]. 
The basic premise for anomaly detection is that there 
is intrinsic and observable characteristic of normal 
behavior that is distinct from that of abnormal 
behavior. Three main parts in anomaly detection 
system are: feature selection, model of normal 
behavior, and comparison [7]. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: 
Section 2 briefly reviews related work. Section 3 
describes the Fuzzy Rough Clustering. Section 4 
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presents the Anomaly Detection Approach Based on 
Fuzzy Rough Clustering. Section 5 describes the 
details of our experiments, and analysis of results. 
Section 6 makes some conclusions and outlines some 
issues for future work.  
 
2. Related work 
 
Since almost all activities are logged on a system, it 
is possible that a manual inspection of these logs 
would allow intrusions to be detected. It is important to 
analyze the audit data even after an attack has 
occurred, for determining the extent of damage 
occurred, this analysis helps in attack track back and 
also helps in recording the attack patterns for future 
prevention of such attacks [8]. 
There are lots of researches on the fuzzy clustering. 
However, most of them focus on the optimization on 
some fuzzy clustering algorithms or application in 
some special cases.  In more recent work, clustering, 
majority of work done is intended to optimize 
clustering. Therefore, we present a feasible detection 
method based on fuzzy rough clustering and high 
accuracy.  
Without labeled information, it is difficult to 
distinguish the true outliers from the low density 
normal points. Many existing anomaly detection 
algorithms consider all the low density normal points 
to be outliers, while others would consider the outliers 
to be normal [9]. Most of the anomaly detection 
algorithms require the training datasets to be free of 
attacks. However, clean data entails considerable 
difficulty for removal of all attacks, including new 
attacks [10].  
There are two major approaches in intrusion 
detection: anomaly detection and misuse detection. 
 
2.1 Misuse detection 
The idea of misuse detection is to represent attacks 
in the form of a pattern or a signature so that the same 
attack can be detected and prevented in the future. 
These systems can detect many or all known attack 
patterns, but they are of little use for detecting naïve 
attack methods [8]. Pattern-matching solutions 
primarily use misuse detection. They employ a library 
of signatures of misuse, which are used to match 
against network traffic. The weaknesses of these 
systems are: variants, false positives, false negatives, 
and data overload. Since they rely on signatures, a new 
variant of an attack can be created to evade detection. 
Additionally, the signatures themselves can create false 
positives if they are not written correctly, or if the 
nature of the attack is difficult to isolate from normal 
traffic characteristics [11]. Earlier studies have utilized 
a rule-based approach for intrusion detection, but had a 
difficulty in identifying new attack or attacks that had 
no previously describe patterns [12]. 
 
2.2 Anomaly detection 
The idea of anomaly detection is to build a normal 
activity profile for a system. Anomalous activities that 
are not intrusive are flagged as intrusive, though they 
are false positives. Actual intrusive activities that go 
undetected are called false negatives. This is a serious 
issue, and is far more serious than the problem of false 
positives [8]. Anomalies or outliers are aberrant 
observations whose characteristics deviate 
significantly from the majority of the data or any 
events that significantly deviate from normal activity 
are considered to be suspicious.  
The main advantage with anomaly intrusion 
algorithms is that they can detect new forms of attacks, 
because these new intrusions will probably deviate 
from the normal behavior [13, 14]. Most of the 
commercial and freeware IDS tools are signature 
based. Such tools can only detect known attacks 
previously described by their corresponding signatures. 
The signature database should be maintained and 
updated periodically and manually for new attacks. For 
this reason, many data mining and machine learning 
algorithms are developed to discover new attacks that 
are not described in the training labeled data [14]. 
Many intrusion detection approaches have been 
proposed which include statistical [13], machine 
learning [15], data mining [16] and immunological 
inspired techniques [9].   
 
3. Fuzzy Rough Clustering 
 
C-means (HCM) assigns a label to an object 
definitely; the membership value is 0 or 1. While fuzzy 
C-means (FCM) maps a membership over the arrange 
0 to 1; each object belongs to some or all of the 
clusters to some fuzzy degrees. Rough c-means (RCM) 
classify the object space into three parts, lower 
approximation, boundary and negative region. Then 
different weighting values are taken in computing the 
new centers, respectively. 
All the objects with RCM in lower approximation 
take the same weight and all the objects in boundary 
take another weighting index uniformly. In fact, the 
objects in boundary regions have different influence on 
the centers and clusters. So different weighting should 
be imposed on the objects. The fuzziness membership 
should be imposed on the objects in boundary.  
Define that membership function is given by [17]. 
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The new centers are calculated by 
 
 
The objective function used is  
 
The lower and upper approximations are defined 
respectively 
 
For each object x and center point v, D(x,v) is the 
distance from x to v. The differences between D(x,vi) 
and D(x,vj) are used to determine the label of x. Let 
 
1
( , ) min ( , )j ii cD x v D x v≤ ≤= and 
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 The fuzzy rough c-means (FRCM) can be 
formulated as follows in (figError! Reference source 
not found.). FRCM will partitions the data into two 
classes: lower approximation and boundary. Only the 
objects in boundary are fuzzified. 
 
 
Figure 1. Fuzzy Rough c-means algorithm 
 
4.  Anomaly Detection Approach Based on 
Fuzzy Rough Clustering 
 
 
Figure 2.   Fuzzy Rough Clustering framework 
   We take preprocessing in the following three steps: 
    In the first step, we map symbolic-valued attributes 
to numeric-valued attributes. Symbolic features like 
protocol_type (3 different symbols-tcp, udp, icmp), 
service (66 different symbols), and flag (11 different 
symbols) were mapped to integer values ranging from 
1 to N where N is the number of symbols. Attack 
names (like ipsweep, teardrop, etc.) were first mapped 
to one of the five classes, 0 for Normal, 1 for Probe, 2 
for DoS, 3 for U2R, and 4 for R2L. 
     In the second step, we linearly scale each of these 
features to the range [0.0, 1.0]. Features having smaller 
integer value ranges like duration [0, 58329], 
num_compromised [0,884], count [0,511], 
dst_host_count [0,255] were scaled linearly to the 
range [0.0, 1.0]. Two features spanned over a very 
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large integer range, namely src_bytes [0, 693375640] 
and dst_bytes [0, 5203179] were scaled by logarithmic 
scaling (with base e) to the range [0.0, 20.4] and [0, 
15.5]. For Boolean features having values (0 or 1), 
they were left unchanged. 
     The third step involves separating testing dataset 
into 5 groups.  
 
5. Experiments and Analysis 
 
 In our experiments, we perform to classify each of 
the five classes (normal, probe, denial of service 
(DoS), user to super-user, and remote to local) of 
patterns in the KDDCup’99 data. It is shown that using 
fuzzy rough c-means for clustering. The (training and 
testing) data set contains 1,011 randomly generated 
points from the five classes. The distribution of attacks 
in the KDD Cup dataset is extremely unbalanced. 
Some attacks are represented with only a few 
examples, e.g. the phf and ftp_write attacks, whereas 
the smurf and neptune attacks cover millions of 
records. In general, the distribution of attacks is 
dominated by probes and denial-of-service (DoS) 
attacks; the most interesting and dangerous attacks, 
such as compromises, are grossly under 
represented[18]. 
 
5.1 Description of Data Sets 
The KDD Cup 1999 [19]  data sets are the 
authoritative testing data sets in current intrusion 
detection field. This is dataset of features from 
network packets classified into non-attack and four 
attack categories. The data are labeled as attack or 
normal, and furthermore are labeled with an attack 
type that can be grouped into four broad categories of 
attacks. The main task of the KDD 99 classifier 
learning contest was to provide a predictive model able 
to distinguish between legitimate (normal) and 
illegitimate (called intrusion or attacks) connections in 
a computer network. Attacks in the data sets are 
divided into four main categories: 
• DOS (Denial of Service), such as ping of death 
attack; 
•  U2R (User to Root), such as eject attack; 
• R2U (Remote to User), such as guest attack; 
• PROBING, such as port scanning attack. 
 
 In the data set, for each TCP/IP connection, there 
are 41 attributes and a field indicated the intrusion 
type. Some of the attributes are numerical, such as 
duration, num_failed_logins, etc. The 10% data set that 
we used contains 22 different types of intrusions. The 
total number of this data set is 494,021. In the 
experiment, we cut the fields that only contain the zero 
values, the rest have 33 features. We select a testing 
data set which contained 1,011 records as shown in 
Table 1 
Table 1. Data set for this work  
 
 
5.2 Experiments on Anomaly Detection 
The performance measures are calculated from TP, 
TN, FP, and FN, which respectively denote the 
numbers of true positives (system traces predicted to 
be intrusions that are in fact intrusions), true negatives, 
false positives, and false negatives. Standard metrics 
that were developed for evaluating network intrusions 
usually correspond to detection rate as well as false 
alarm rate. 
1. True Positives (TP), the number of malicious 
executables correctly classified as malicious; 
2. True Negatives (TN), the number of benign 
programs correctly classified as benign; 
3. False Positives (FP), the number of benign 
programs falsely classified as malicious,  
4. False Negative (FN), the number of malicious 
executables falsely classified as benign. 
The measures are based on the formulate 
 
 
 
TP TNAccuracy
TP TN FP FN
+= + + +  (5)
 TPDetection rate
TP FP
= +  (6)
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where the correlation coefficient is a measure of 
how predictions correlate with actual data. This ranges 
from -1 to 1 where a correlation coefficient of 1 
corresponds to predictions that perfectly match class 
labels, and a coefficient of 0 corresponds to random 
guessing [6]. We test the Kmeans and FRCM. Table 3  
shows the comparison between Kmeans and FRCM 
methods 
 
Table 2. Result from experimental  
 
 
Table 3. Comparison Kmeans and FRCM  
 
 
    The primarily results show that the performance of a 
proposed approach based on fuzzy rough c-means is 
good. The advantage of using fuzzy logic is that it 
allows one to represent concepts that could be 
considered to be in more than one category (or from 
another point of view – it allows representation of 
overlapping categories).  
 
6. Conclusion and Future Work 
 
The fuzzy rough clustering algorithm has many 
advantages. In this paper, we presented a method for 
clustering to detect normal and abnormal behaviors. 
We are combining two soft computing methods, a 
fuzzy rough c-means clustering algorithm (FRCM) that 
characterizes each class with a positive region, a fuzzy 
boundary region and a negative region.  
It is difficult to make a judgment between normal 
and abnormal behaviors in certain conditions. So 
FRCM is introduced to score and distinguish the 
intrusion behaviors. The result shows that it achieved a 
good performance that compare with Kmeans methods.   
Intrusion detection model is a composition model 
that needs various theories and techniques. One or two 
models can hardly offer satisfying results. We plan to 
apply other theories and techniques to operate in a high 
accurate and low false alarm rate in intrusion detection 
in our future work. 
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